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GIRLS’ SCHOOLS AFTER VMI: DO THEY
MAKE THE GRADE?
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*

I. INTRODUCTION
Forty years after the United States Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board of
1
2
Education that racially segregated schools violate the Equal Protection Clause,
3
the Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia held that Virginia failed to justify
the exclusion of qualified women from the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a
prestigious college with a powerful alumni network that has excluded women
4
for 157 years. In a 7-1 opinion, the Court held that a state may not wholly exclude women from an important and unique educational program for which
some are qualified, even if women on average are not suited or qualified for
5
admission. The Court rejected Virginia’s argument that men and women have
different developmental and educational needs which justify excluding women
from VMI and segregating them in a separate and non-military “leadership”
6
program at Mary Baldwin College, a private women’s college. The Citadel, the
only other all-male public college, conceded defeat in its battle to preserve its allmale tradition immediately after the decision was announced; VMI followed suit
7
three months later.
Less than one month after the Supreme Court held that VMI’s gender-based
admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause, public school officials in
New York City announced their decision to open a new public school for girls in
8
September 1996. The school, named the Young Women’s Leadership School
(YWLS), was proposed and developed by Ann Rubenstein Tisch, a prominent
philanthropist and former television reporter, with the support of a conservative
educational thinktank, the Manhattan Institute for Educational Innovation, well
known for its support of school vouchers and other efforts to privatize public
9
schools.

* Instructor, New York University School of Law. The author represented Shannon Faulkner
in The Citadel litigation.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2287 (1996) [hereinafter VMI V].
4. See id. at 2284.
5. See id. at 2282-86.
6. See id. at 2279-82.
7. See Mike Allen, Defiant V.M.I. to Admit Women, But Will Not Ease Rules for Them, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 1996, at A1.
8. See Jacques Steinberg, Central Board Backs All-Girls School, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1996, at B3.
9. See id. Ms. Tisch and her husband reportedly have not donated any funds for the school, but
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The argument in favor of single-sex schools for girls seeks to distinguish allfemale schools, which many claim serve a compensatory purpose, from all-male
schools. Unlike Brown, VMI did not consider whether the separate but equal
10
doctrine from Plessy v. Ferguson was nevertheless constitutional when applied
to schools segregated by sex. Advocates of single-sex schools for women argue
that VMI and The Citadel unlawfully denied women access to unique opportu11
nities based upon traditional beliefs that women are not suited for the military,
but all-female schools maximize the learning environment for young girls,
12
whom they claim learn better in single-sex schools.
13
While the existence of a “chilly classroom” denies many girls equal educational opportunity, the decision to resegregate public schools is neither a constitutional nor a desirable remedy. While the Supreme Court suggested in dicta
in VMI that certain women’s colleges might be justified under a compensatory
14
rationale, it also held that a state may not exclude qualified students based
15
upon the “average” abilities or alleged needs of male and female students. As
the Supreme Court recognized in VMI, the arguments for single-sex schools rest
upon the same gender stereotypes and generalizations used throughout history
16
to exclude women from public education and traditionally male professions.
The Young Women’s Leadership School is no exception. Its founders rely on the
precise stereotypes and generalizations about women as The Citadel and VMI
17
18
did: girls, they assert, learn differently from boys.
The segregation of public schools on the basis of gender resurrects a classificatory scheme that represents gender difference as natural and essential. State
sponsored segregation perpetuates the mistaken belief that women are inherently different from men, not only in their cognitive abilities but in tempera19
ment, personality, and psychology. Unlike affirmative action plans that seek to
increase women’s inclusion in the public sphere, segregating young women in
separate schools invokes the history of “separate spheres” used to restrict
20
women’s place and opportunities in society.

have pledged to recruit businesses, universities, and hospitals to create internships for its female students. See id.
10. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
11. See Brief of Twenty-Six Private Women’s Colleges as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
12, VMI V, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107) [hereinafter Women’s College Brief].
12. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Employment Law Center et al., VMI V, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996)
(Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107) (describing education programs designed for girls and women as “vehicles
for promoting full inclusion and integration . . . .”).
13. See ROBERTA M. HALL & BERNICE R. SANDLER, THE CAMPUS CLIMATE: A CHILLY ONE FOR
WOMEN 3 (1982) (describing the “chilly” climate and its effects on all students).
14. See VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2276-77.
15. See id. at 2280.
16. See id. at 2280-81.
17. See id.
18. See Steinberg, supra note 8, at B3 (describing research cited by the school board showing
poorer performance by girls in coeducational settings); see also discussion infra notes 43, 143-47 and
accompanying text.
19. Cf. VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2280-81.
20. Cf. id. at 2280; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that “separate but equal”
was constitutional with regard to race).
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To reinforce the doctrine of separate but equal is to further entrench the cultural myth of difference that renders distinctions and discrimination against
21
women as natural and essential. We are right to be concerned about the education and welfare of our daughters. Rather than reinstate the educational segregation of women, however, we should pursue educational reforms which foster
inclusion and respect, and simultaneously teach girls and boys to reject stereotypes based on gender.
II. UNMASKING GENDER DIFFERENCE AS EXCLUSION
A. Constitutional Scrutiny of Race and Gender Based Classifications
In Brown, the Supreme Court rejected the separate but equal doctrine of
22
Plessy v. Ferguson, holding that separate schools for black children were inher23
ently unequal. In condemning racial segregation in education, the Court recognized that classifying students based on their race reinforced their exclusion
24
from socioeconomic opportunities in life. The Court held that access to education was critical to prepare children for success in life and was “a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environ25
ment.” In addition to denying black children equal opportunity, the process of
racial segregation “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
26
undone.” Brown recognized the power of classificatory schemes to distinguish
and stigmatize racial minorities and to perpetuate the exclusion of persons of
color from social institutions, such as public education, which are gatekeepers
27
for social and economic opportunity.
Unlike racial classifications, gender classifications have not been treated by
28
the courts as inherently suspect. While Brown held that racially segregated
29
public schools violate the Equal Protection Clause under the highest level of
scrutiny known as strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has not held that single-sex
schools’ must meet this tough standard. In its 1982 decision in Mississippi
30
University for Women v. Hogan, the Supreme Court considered whether the exclusion of men from an all-female nursing school violated the Equal Protection
Clause. Hogan held that a state may segregate public educational programs on
21. Cf. VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2279 (discussing the district court’s findings of “gender based developmental differences.”).
22. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
23. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
24. See id. at 493-94.
25. Id. at 493.
26. Id. at 494.
27. See id. at 493.
28. If a classification is inherently suspect it is subject to strict scrutiny. See William Henry
Hurd, Gone with the Wind? VMI’s Loss and the Future of Single-Sex Public Education, 4 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL’Y 27, n.29 (1997) (describing the three levels of constitutional scrutiny for equal protection:
rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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the basis of gender so long as a state proves an “exceedingly persuasive justifi31
cation” to justify differential treatment based on sex. While a gender classification cannot be based on overly broad stereotypes or generalizations, the Court
held that a gender classification that is substantially related to a “benign, com32
pensatory purpose” might survive scrutiny. In the case of Mississippi
University for Women’s (MUW) female nursing school, however, the Court held
that Mississippi had not proven that the exclusion of men from a nursing school
33
served such a compensatory purpose. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for
the majority, concluded that women were overrepresented in the nursing profession and that Mississippi had failed to show that, at the time that MUW
opened, women lacked opportunities to obtain training or leadership positions
34
in nursing, or that currently women were deprived of such opportunities. The
Court concluded that MUW’s single-sex policy did not compensate for discriminatory gender barriers, but perpetuated the stereotype that women were better
35
suited for nursing than men.
The Court’s failure to treat classifications based on gender the same as
those based on race contradicted its explicit and repeated recognition of the
similarity in the historical exclusion of both groups. The Supreme Court first
recognized the history of discrimination against women in 1973, in Frontiero v.
36
Richardson:
[T]hroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society
was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War
slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or
bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied
the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of
their own children. And although blacks were guaranteed the right to vote in
1870, women were denied even that right—which is itself “preservative of other
basic civil and political rights”—until adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment
37
half a century later.

However, in applying the rational basis test for classifications based on
gender, the courts upheld a host of discriminatory state policies, including laws

31. See id. at 724; see also Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, The Myths and Justifications of Sex Segregation in
Higher Education: VMI and The Citadel, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 101, 105 n.31 (1997).
32. See 458 U.S. at 728 (citation omitted).
33. See id. at 729.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 729-30.
36. 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 685.
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38

that excluded women from, among other things, practicing law and serving on
39
juries.
Two years earlier, the Supreme Court had raised the level of scrutiny for
40
gender classifications in Reed v. Reed. This heightened level of scrutiny, now
known as intermediate scrutiny, was still an easier test than strict scrutiny used
for racial classification. In Reed v. Reed, the court held that a state must demonstrate that a sex-based classification is substantially related to an important state
41
purpose. The Supreme Court did not explain its reasons for subjecting gender
classifications to less scrutiny than racial classifications, leading to widespread
criticism by courts and commentators alike that intermediate scrutiny is inde42
terminate. Absent judicial gloss, many lower courts have interpreted intermediate scrutiny to reflect the Court’s judgment that there are fundamental differences between men and women that justify more deferential review than racial
classifications.
B. Gender Classifications in VMI and The Citadel
In defending its historical exclusion of women, VMI justified denying
women access to its valuable and important educational program by constructing its argument around the same myth of difference relied upon in Bradwell and
43
other pre-Reed cases. VMI and The Citadel were the only remaining public col38. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). Justice Bradley concurred in the Court’s decision upholding the exclusion of women from the practice of law, finding that:
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . . The paramount destiny and mission
of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of
the Creator.
Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). By rationalizing the exclusion of women based upon their assumed
attributes and different roles as wife and mother, this “attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ . . . put
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.” Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684 (citation omitted).
39. See Strauder v. West Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1880). In Strauder, the Supreme Court held that the exclusion of African American men from juries violated the Fourteenth Amendment, but emphasized that
a state “may confine the selection [of jurors] to males . . . .” Id. at 310. Under English common law,
women were excluded from juries under “the doctrine of propter defectum sexus, literally, the ‘defect of
sex.’” J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 132 (1994) (citation omitted). American courts that excluded
women held that women were “too fragile and virginal to withstand the polluted courtroom atmosphere.” See Bailey v. State, 219 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Ark. 1949) (“Criminal court trials often involve testimony of the foulest kind, and they sometimes require consideration of indecent conduct, the use of
filthy and loathsome words, references to intimate sex relationships, and other elements that would
prove humiliating, embarrassing and degrading to a lady.”).
40. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
41. See id. at 76 (“A classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”) (citation omitted).
42. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 91 (1989)
(“The doctrinal legacy of the 1970s is an intermediate standard that recognizes the legitimacy of some
gender classifications without a theory about which are legitimate and why.”).
43. The United States filed suit against VMI and the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1990, alleging
that VMI’s male-only admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th
Cir. 1992), on remand, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff’d, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev’d, 116 S. Ct.
2264 (1996) [hereinafter VMI I].
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leges in the United States that offered either a military-style or males-only edu44
cation. VMI and The Citadel cadets live in barracks in a military-style environment, similar to the federal service academies, which subjects cadets to mental
45
stress, physical rigor, lack of privacy, and a stringent honor code. Both VMI and
The Citadel occupy a unique place in Southern history and culture. The Citadel
46
was founded before the Civil War to protect white society from slave revolts.
47
VMI cadets fought federal troops in the Civil War at New Market, Virginia.
VMI and The Citadel offer their male graduates access to a host of socioeconomic and political opportunities through their powerful alumni networks,
48
which boast military generals, prominent politicians, and business leaders.
Unlike MUW, VMI did not claim that its exclusionary policy served a compensatory purpose. Relying largely on theories of difference espoused by some
49
feminists, VMI constructed its defense around the myth of gender difference.
50
VMI and The Citadel both bolstered their respective claims of difference with
51
the research and literature of prominent feminist social scientists, such as Carol
Gilligan, who posits that men and women have different styles of moral reason52
ing and thinking. Feminist attempts to celebrate the stereotypical attributes of
gender assigned to females thus were co-opted by defendants who sought to
deny women equal access and opportunity. Their experts testified that fundamental physical, psychological, and developmental differences between men
and women make VMI’s military-style education inappropriate for most
53
women. These “physiological and sociological differences” between men and
54
women are “real” and “not stereotypes.” VMI’s experts argued that college age
men have more self confidence than college age women, tend toward more impulsive and risk taking behavior, and need a more structured and competitive
55
learning environment. Women, however, are “more nurturing and concerned
with relationships than men, who are concerned with formal rules and author56
ity.” According to The Citadel’s argument, “men are significantly more com-

44. See 2 Soldiers’ Daughters to Enter Citadel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1996, at A9.
45. See VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2270; Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226, 236 (4th Cir. 1993) (“The Citadel
provides a remarkably similar, if not identical, program [to VMI’s].”).
46. See Susan Faludi, The Naked Citadel, NEW YORKER, Sept. 1994, at 62, 66. (discussing The
Citadel’s military tradition and culture).
47. See United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter VMI II].
48. See VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2285; see also Valorie K. Vojdik, At War: Narrative Tactics in The Citadel
and VMI Litigation, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 1 (1996).
49. See Deposition of Carol Gilligan at 1-3, Johnson v. Jones, 42 F.3d 1385 (4th Cir. 1994) No.
2:92-1674-2 (D.S.C.) (Jan. 7, 1993) (No. 2:92-1674-2).
50. See id.
51. See Vojdik, supra note 48.
52. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S
DEVELOPMENT 22 (1982) (“Given the differences in women’s conceptions of self and morality,
women bring to the life cycle a different point of view and order human experience in terms of different priorities.”).
53. See VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2283-84.
54. Id.
55. See Vojdik, supra note 48, at 6 n.38 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 6.
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petitive and aggressive; women place much greater emphasis on relationships
and cooperation,” and “men display the trait of dominance more than women.”
As a result of these gender differences, the defendants argued, women
were not suited to the stressful military-style education offered at VMI (or The
Citadel for that matter), which was “not designed to accommodate the devel57
opmental needs of the vast majority of college age women.” The Citadel
claimed that “[a]dversative instructional techniques are not optimal for instilling
58
confidence in college age women and maximizing their potential.” In fact, The
Citadel claimed that its system of education “would not be optimal for even the
59
most aggressive and competitive women in the country.” The Citadel concluded that “[f]or most girls and women, The Citadel’s system of ritualistic dis60
cipline and experiences would be meaningless.” The VMI experts urged that
“[g]iven these developmental differences females and males characteristically
61
learn differently.” They explained that “[m]ales tend to need an environment of
adversativeness or ritual combat in which the teacher is a disciplinarian and a
62
worthy competitor.” On the other hand, “[f]emales tend to thrive in a cooperative atmosphere in which the teacher is emotionally connected with the stu63
dents.” It was argued that the “nature of an experience that is growthproducing for a number of women is one that is supportive, is one that empha64
sizes positive motivation.”
Along with invoking the myth of gender difference, both VMI and The
Citadel denied that their arbitrary exclusion of women discriminated against
65
women. VMI attempted to mask its exclusion of women by redefining itself as a
66
single-sex college rather than a traditional male military college, ignoring the
67
unique history and place in Southern society and tradition that VMI holds. The
VMI experts argued that single-sex education is extremely beneficial for both
men and women because of the ability to work “without the intrusion of any
sexual tension,” and because “[s]tudents of both sexes become more academically involved, interact with faculty frequently, show larger increases in intellectual self-esteem and are more satisfied with practically all aspects of college
68
experience.” Echoing the claims of supporters of women’s schools, VMI argued
that all-female schools “increase the chances that women will obtain positions of
leadership, complete the baccalaureate degree, and aspire to higher degrees,”

57. See Citadel Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact at 45, Faulkner v. Jones , 858 F. Supp 552
(D.S.C. 1994) (No. 2:93-488-2) [hereinafter Proposed Findings of Fact].
58. Id. at 51.
59. Id. at 52.
60. Id. at 53.
61. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1434.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 1412-14; Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552, 554-55 (D.S.C. 1994), aff’d in part,
modified in part, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1996).
66. See VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1415.
67. Id. at 1434.
68. Id. at 1435.
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and that students would be “more likely to take the risk of choosing a career
69
normally associated with the other sex.”
The Citadel argued that single-sex education is particularly important to
women in the fields of math and science, because “young men tend to dominate
coeducational schools [and] [s]tatistically, males have higher math aptitude
70
scores than females.” Women who attend single-sex colleges, The Citadel as71
serted, “are more likely to enter traditional male fields of math and sciences.”
Because adolescent girls care about “what boys think of them,” they “dare not
72
do well” in math and science, for fear of “threaten[ing] boys.” The Citadel and
VMI concluded that providing women with the non-military “leadership” programs at Mary Baldwin College in Virginia and Converse College in South
73
Carolina would better meet the educational needs of most women. In contrast,
VMI and The Citadel claimed that the admission of women to their programs
would materially change and destroy these military colleges, which were de74
signed for men. The current president of VMI, Major General Josiah Bunting III,
also a witness for The Citadel, testified that the admission of women would be a
75
“toxic kind of virus” that would materially change and destroy The Citadel.
Throughout the litigation, VMI and The Citadel argued that the fate of all
women’s colleges turned on whether these traditional military colleges could
remain all-male. In an ironic twist of gender confusion, these historically male
76
institutions, which “not only practice[] inequality, but celebrate[] it,” adopted
the arguments historically made by Smith College and Wellesley College in sup77
port of all-female schools. Ignoring the history of single-sex education as exclusive, the defendants claimed that the issue was whether single-sex education
benefits students, not whether a state could continue to deny qualified women
78
admission to a traditional military-style college. The degendering of VMI and
The Citadel provided its supporters with a springboard to argue that extending

69. Id.
70. See Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 57, at 62.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 63.
73. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 478-80 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff’d, 44 F.3d 1229
(4th Cir. 1995), rev’d, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) [hereinafter VMI III]; see also Proposed Findings of Fact,
supra note 57, at 52.
74. See VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1412-13; VMI II, 976 F.2d at 896; Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226,
233 (4th Cir. 1993).
75. See Vojdik, supra note 48, at 14 (citation omitted). Virginia’s argument that offering single-sex
education at VMI contributed to diversity in education was the same argument raised by Justice Powell
in his dissent in Hogan, where he asserted that Mississippi could justify excluding men from MUW because it was providing women a “choice” of educational environments. See Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 742-43 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority disagreed, explaining
that the issue was not whether the favored gender benefits, but whether the classification was substantially related to an important government objective. See id. at 724, 731.
76. Faulkner, 10 F.3d at 234 (Hall, J. concurring).
77. The narrative techniques employed by The Citadel and VMI are discussed in more detail in
Vojdik, supra note 48, at 4-8.
78. See, e.g., VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1414-15; Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552, 564 (D.S.C. 1994).

PPVOJDIK

12/05/97 3:38 PM

GIRLS’ SCHOOLS AFTER VMI: DO THEY MAKE THE GRADE?

77

admission to these traditionally male bastions would similarly result in the de79
mise of women’s colleges.
C. VMI: The Decisions
VMI’s attempt to defend the exclusion of women by relying on claims of
difference and the need to preserve single-sex education eventually succeeded in
80
81
both the district court and the court of appeals. Judge Jackson Kiser in the
Western District of Virginia held that VMI’s exclusion of women substantially
furthered Virginia’s interest in providing diversity within Virginia’s educational
system by offering single-sex education, which the court found benefits both
82
men and women. Accepting the stereotypes of men and women offered by
VMI, the district court further found that, while some women might succeed at
VMI, the adversative method was inappropriate for the vast majority of
83
women. According to the district court, VMI’s claims of difference were not
stereotypes or overly broad generalizations, but real differences between men
84
and women. The district court further found that women would change VMI’s
85
86
adversative method and thereby destroy the school. Specifically, the court
found that VMI would be required to make allowances for personal privacy, alter its physical education requirements for women, and change its adversative
87
environment.
On the case’s first appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court, holding that Virginia had “failed to articulate an important policy
that substantially supports offering the unique benefits of a VMI-type education
88
to men and not to women.” While the Fourth Circuit agreed that single-sex
education provides important pedagogical benefits to both men and women, it
concluded that “neither the goal of producing citizen soldiers nor VMI’s imple89
menting methodology is inherently unsuitable to women . . . .” The Fourth
Circuit agreed with VMI, however, that “[m]en and women are different, and
our knowledge about the differences, physiological and psychological, is be90
coming increasingly more sophisticated.” Given these differences, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the admission of women would materially change VMI
and refused to order VMI to admit women in light of the “generally recognized

79. Amici for VMI also warned that requiring VMI to admit women would likewise disable
women’s colleges from remaining all-female. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae States (Wyoming and Pennsylvania) in Support of the Commonwealth of Virginia at 11-17, VMI V, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (Nos. 941941, 94-2107); Brief of Mary Baldwin College as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 20-29,
VMI V (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107) [hereinafter Mary Baldwin Brief].
80. See VMI I, 766 F. Supp. 1407.
81. See VMI II, 976 F.2d 890.
82. See VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1414-15.
83. See id. at 1412-13.
84. See id. at 1434-35.
85. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also Hurd, supra note 28, at 28-29.
86. See VMI I, 766 F. Supp at 1412-13.
87. See id.
88. VMI II, 976 F. Supp. at 899.
89. Id. at 899.
90. Id. at 897.
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91

benefit that VMI provides.” Instead, it remanded the case to the district court to
permit Virginia to propose a remedial alternative, which could include coeducation, going private, the establishment of “parallel” programs or institutions, or
92
“other more creative options.”
On remand, Virginia refused to admit women to VMI and instead proposed
the establishment of a separate, and deliberately different, program for women
at Mary Baldwin College, a private women’s college about thirty miles from
93
VMI. The Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL) at Mary Baldwin
is not a military program like VMI, and bears virtually no resemblance to the
94
95
rigorous program at VMI. VWIL does not have a barracks lifestyle, which is
96
the heart of VMI. Rather than emphasize stress and adversity like VMI, the
VWIL program focuses on “cooperative method[s],” which defendants contended were more suitable for women, who lack the confidence and self-esteem
97
of men.
The district court approved the VWIL plan, even though it found that the
98
Mary Baldwin proposal “differs substantially” from the VMI program and that
“if ‘separate but equal’ is the standard by which the Commonwealth’s plan must
99
be measured, then it surely must fail . . . .” While the methodologies of VMI
and Mary Baldwin differed, the court found that the end results would be
100
“comparable.” Invoking the rhetoric of “separate but equal,” Judge Kiser concluded: “If VMI marches to the beat of a drum, then Mary Baldwin marches to
the melody of a fife and when the march is over, both will have arrived at the
101
102
same destination.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed in a 2-1 decision. The panel
majority applied a new “special intermediate scrutiny test” under which a state
could provide separate educational programs for men and women as long as the
benefits provided to each gender were “substantively comparable” and did not
103
tend “to lessen the dignity, respect, or societal regard of the other gender.”
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, stating that its caselaw
104
“reveal[s] a strong presumption that gender classifications are invalid.” Citing
its decision in Hogan, the majority held that a state must show “at least that the
[challenged] classification serves ‘important governmental objectives and that

91. See id. at 900.
92. See id. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. See Virginia Military Inst. v. United States, 508
U.S. 946 (1993).
93. See VMI III, 852 F. Supp. at 476-77.
94. See id. at 477-78.
95. See id.
96. See VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2283.
97. See VMI III, 852 F. Supp. at 476.
98. See id. at 473.
99. Id. at 475.
100. See id. at 473.
101. Id. at 484.
102. See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev’d, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996)
[hereinafter VMI IV].
103. Id. at 1237.
104. VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2275 (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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the discriminatory means employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achieve105
ment of those objectives.’” Consistent with its skeptical view of discriminatory
gender classifications, the Court further held that “[t]he justification must be
genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it
must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capaci106
ties, or preferences of males and females.”
While the Court observed that there are physical differences between
men and women that might justify differential treatment, it held that so-called
average differences in the abilities, traits, and interests of men and women do
not justify the state sponsored exclusion of women. A state may adopt sex-based
classifications “to compensate women ‘for particular economic disabilities [they
have] suffered,’ to ‘promote equal employment opportunity,’ [or] to advance full
107
development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s people.” Such classifications may not be used, however, “to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and
108
economic inferiority of women.” Thus, VMI narrows the range of permissible
uses of gender and claims of gender difference as bases for state classifications.
The Court was openly skeptical in examining VMI’s proffered justification, recalling the history of women’s disenfranchisement and exclusion from the
public sphere, including higher education, and dismissing VMI’s defense as a
109
post hoc rationalization of its desire to remain all-male. First, the Court rejected
Virginia’s assertion that the exclusion of women from VMI was substantially related to providing a diverse range of educational programs, including single-sex
110
colleges. While Virginia claimed that the absence of any single-sex school for
women was “an historical anomaly,” the Court found that history proved oth111
erwise. The Court recounted in detail Virginia’s refusal to provide higher education to daughters, which Virginia considered to be “dangerous” for women;
then providing women with schools that lacked equal resources and stature to
men’s schools; and finally transforming all of its public colleges from single-sex
112
schools into coeducational institutions, except for VMI. Moreover, the Court
held that a purpose that “genuinely” sought to provide educational diversity
113
was not served by VMI offering its unique program only to men.
The Court likewise rejected Virginia’s argument that there are “genderbased developmental differences” that would require VMI to materially change
114
its methodology if women were admitted. Reciting its earlier decisions in
Hogan and J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Court reiterated that state actors may not exclude qualified individuals based on stereotypes or generalizations concerning

105. Id. (emphasis added) ((citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)
(citation omitted)).
106. Id. (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 2276 (citations omitted).
108. Id.
109. See id. at 2274-78.
110. See id. at 2278-79.
111. See id. at 2278.
112. See id. at 2277-78.
113. See id. at 2279.
114. See id. at 2279-80, 2283 (quoting VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1434-35).
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the roles and abilities of men and women. Although the lower courts found
that the admission of women would materially change VMI, the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that women would destroy VMI as a “self-fulfilling
prophec[y]” no different than similar arguments used throughout history to
deny women access to male-only education, the military, and many professions,
116
including the law.
The Court similarly rejected Virginia’s remedial proposal to create an allfemale alternative to VMI at Mary Baldwin that did not offer women rigorous
and stressful military training, but instead provided a “‘cooperative method’ of
117
education ‘which reinforces self-esteem.’” The Court held that Virginia could
not justify these pedagogical differences based on alleged “important differences
118
between men and women in learning and developmental needs.” Such generalizations about “the way women are” or what is “appropriate for most women”
do not justify “denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place
119
them outside the average description.” The Court also held that the VWIL program was a “‘pale shadow’ of VMI” in terms of its curricular offerings, “faculty
120
stature, funding, prestige, alumni support and influence.” The Court compared Virginia’s creation of the Mary Baldwin program to Texas’ attempt 50
121
years ago in Sweatt v. Painter to create a law school for black students rather
than integrate the University of Texas. Under Sweatt’s analysis, Virginia had
failed to provide “substantial equality in the separate educational opportunities
122
the State supports at VWIL and VMI.”
In rejecting VMI’s claim of gender differences, the Court ignored the factual
findings of the lower courts that men and women have different developmental

115. See id. at 2280; see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982); J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994).
116. See VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2280-81.
117. Id. at 2283 (quoting VMI III, 852 F. Supp. at 476).
118. Id.; see also Brief for Respondent at 28, VMI V, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107).
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred, but noted that, unlike the majority, he did not believe that the only
remedy available to VMI was coeducation. Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in Hogan, described the
violation in VMI not as the exclusion of women from VMI, but rather Virginia’s decision to offer an allmale school without a “corresponding” institution for women. See VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2290 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring). In Rehnquist’s opinion, an adequate remedy would not be limited to admitting
women to VMI or providing a “VMI clone for women,” but could include “a demonstration by Virginia
that its interest in educating men in a single-sex environment is matched by its interest in educating
women in a single-sex institution.” Id. at 2291. A state need not create two institutions with the same
curriculum, number of faculty Ph.D.s, or comparable athletic fields; one school could emphasize computer science and the other liberal arts. See id. It would be sufficient if the two institutions “offered the
same quality of education and were of the same overall calibre.” Id. In the case of VMI, Rehnquist concluded that the VWIL plan failed as a remedy because it was “distinctly inferior to [VMI] and will continue to be for the foreseeable future,” and “is not, in any sense, the institution that VMI is.” Id.
119. Id. at 2284.
120. Id. at 2285. The Court first held that, under well-established desegregation case law, Virginia
must provide a remedy that puts women in “the position they would have occupied” absent the discriminatory conduct, “eliminate[s] [so far as possible] the discriminatory effects of the past,” and “bar[s]
like discrimination in the future.” See id. at 2282 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977);
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
121. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
122. VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2286.
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123

and educational needs. Its analysis largely rested on the right of the individual
124
to equal opportunity. The Court held that a state may not deny to women who
have the will and capacity the unique training and opportunities offered at VMI,
and that Virginia’s justification for excluding all women from VMI’s training, for
125
which some women are qualified, “cannot rank as ‘exceedingly persuasive.’”
Emphasizing the right of each person to be judged as an individual and not
based on his or her sex, the Court held that the asserted goal of creating citizensoldiers “is not substantially advanced by women’s categorical exclusion, in total
126
disregard of their individual merit,” from VMI’s prestigious program.
While the majority in VMI did not address the issue of strict scrutiny
(which the United States argued for the first time on appeal), Justice Scalia, in his
dissent, observed that the Court, at a minimum, “purports to reserve the ques127
tion” whether strict scrutiny applies to gender classification. In describing the
review of gender classifications, the majority throughout the opinion appeared
to suggest that strict scrutiny might be appropriate under certain circumstances.
The Court wrote that its post-Reed jurisprudence had not “equat[ed] gender classifications, for all purposes, to classifications based on race or national ori128
gin . . . .” It further explained that “[t]he Court has thus far reserved most strin129
gent judicial scrutiny for classifications based on race or national origin . . . .”
The Court’s careful choice of words suggests a deliberate attempt to leave open
the possibility that it might choose to apply strict scrutiny in at least some circumstances in the future. The Court did not, however, discuss the circumstances
under which a higher level of review might apply.
The Court in VMI declined to address the broader issue of single-sex education in general. Amici urged that single-sex colleges contribute to educational

123. Cf. id. at 2279.
124. See id. at 2280, 2287.
125. Id. at 2281.
126. Id. at 2282. In underscoring the right of the individual to equal protection, the majority’s reasoning in VMI paralleled Justice Kennedy’s recent concurrence in J.E.B., finding that gender-based peremptory challenges, like those based on race, are unconstitutional. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127,
151-54 (1994). The Supreme Court treated gender like race in examining whether peremptory strikes
based on gender were constitutional. See id. at 135-36. There, the justification for permitting strikes
based on race and gender were essentially the same, as both were based on stereotypical beliefs about
the way people would vote or think. See id. at 139-40. The majority held that the court could not permit
classifications whose defense rests on “the very stereotype the law condemns.” See id. at 138 (quoting
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). The Court also examined the historical context for the use of
peremptory strikes, noting that both blacks and women were excluded from jury service until only recently. See id. at 136. Justice Kennedy explained that the Equal Protection Clause is concerned with the
rights of the individual and protects his or her right to be treated as an individual, not simply “as a representative of a racial or sexual group.” See id. at 153.
127. See VMI V, 116 S. Ct at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice Scalia argues that if the issue
of level of review were to be reconsidered, the stronger argument would be that the standard should be
reduced to the rational basis test. See id. at 2295-96 (emphasis added). In support of this novel suggestion,
Scalia explains that the pre-Reed doctrine would more fully comport with the rational basis test under
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), because women are not a “discrete and
insular minorit[y]” unable to employ the political processes ordinarily relied on to protect minorities.
See VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2296.
128. Id. at 2275 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 2275 n.6 (emphasis added).
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diversity and that some single-sex schools sought “to dissipate, rather than per130
petuate, traditional gender classifications.” The Court explained that it did not
question a state’s ability to support evenhandedly diverse educational opportu131
nities. Rather, the Court explained, its decision addressed only an educational
opportunity which the lower courts found was “unique” and available only at
132
the state’s sole single-sex college. Because Virginia did not offer separate and
substantially equal single-sex schools to men and women in an evenhanded
fashion, the Court emphasized, as it did in Hogan, that VMI did not raise the
question of “whether States can provide ‘separate but equal’ undergraduate in133
stitutions for males and females.”
The Supreme Court in VMI indicated that gender-based classifications may
134
be justified, however, if designed to redress past discrimination. In rejecting
the argument raised by women’s colleges that striking down VMI’s males-only
policy would threaten the existence of women’s colleges, the majority cited
David Riesman, an expert for both VMI and The Citadel, who recognized that
male colleges are likely to reinforce assumptions of male superiority in a world
where men and women are not equal:
The pluralistic argument for preserving all-male colleges is uncomfortably
similar to the pluralistic argument for preserving all-white colleges . . . . The allmale college would be relatively easy to defend if it emerged from a world in
which women were established as fully equal to men. But it does not. It is therefore likely to be a witting or unwitting device for preserving tacit assumptions
135
of male superiority—assumptions for which women must eventually pay.

As an historical matter, women have been excluded throughout American
136
history from prestigious colleges such as VMI and The Citadel. Unlike men’s
colleges, many women’s colleges seek to compensate for the historical discrimination against women in education and the lack of gender equity in coeducational environments. Neither VMI nor The Citadel purports to compensate men
for past discrimination; their exclusionary policies instead reflect outmoded notions of gender roles and stereotypes. To equate traditionally male military colleges with all-female schools designed to compensate women for past discrimination in education is tantamount to claiming that all-white colleges are the
same as historically black colleges. VMI’s argument that the fate of women’s
colleges rises and falls with that of the all-male military colleges deliberately ignored the social and historical context of single-sex education in this nation.

130. Women’s College Brief, supra note 11, at 5; see also VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2276 n.7.
131. See VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2276 n.7.
132. See id.
133. Id. (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 720 n.1(1982)).
134. See VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
135. Id. at 2277 n.8 (citing CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & DAVID RIESMAN, THE ACADEMIC REVOLUTION 29798 (1968)).
136. The undergraduate schools at Yale and Princeton became coeducational in 1969, followed
by Brown and Dartmouth in 1972, Harvard in 1976, and finally Columbia in 1983. See BARNARD/COLUMBIA WOMEN’S HANDBOOK COLLECTIVE, THE BARNARD/COLUMBIA WOMEN’S
HANDBOOK iv (1992).
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Even assuming that single-sex education can be shown to compensate
women for discrimination in education, a state may not rely on stereotypes
about the attributes, interests, or abilities of men and women to defend single137
sex education. In VMI, for example, the Court rejected Virginia’s argument
that women benefited from a single-sex environment because men and women
have “developmental differences” that justify a different educational environ138
ment. A state could more easily show that a single-sex school meets muster
under VMI if it can show that the school redresses differences in skills, abilities,
or opportunities that have been caused by systematic discrimination in the educational system. The question remains as to whether girls-only schools are truly
benign measures or whether, as argued below, they stigmatize women as deficient and perpetuate notions of difference that ultimately inure to women’s detriment.
III. SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS
A. Reinforcing Distinctions Through Segregation
Segregating girls in a separate school is an unnecessary and undesirable
means to improve gender access and equity. In support of single-sex schools for
girls, proponents of single-sex education cite research showing that in coeduca139
tional classrooms teachers pay more attention to boys than girls. They also
claim that girls in coeducational schools do not perform as well as boys, par140
ticularly in math and science.
Supporters of single-sex schools for girls understandably seek to improve
education for young women and to eliminate stubbornly persistent inequities
between males and females in the classroom. While few would claim that singlesex education is a panacea, or even the best long term solution, many would say
they are frustrated by the failure of coeducation to treat girls fairly and prefer to
rely on single-sex education in the meantime to maximize the opportunities
available to girls today. Undoubtedly, all-female schools offer some women an
effective and empowering education. The more troubling issue is whether the
state should offer public single-sex schools, rather than permit single-sex schools
141
to remain exclusively in the private sector. To permit a state to operate singlesex schools reinforces separation of the sexes and brands women as inherently
different from and inferior to men in society.
As VMI recounts, separate schools for men and women were not created
142
based upon the desire to treat women as equals. The history of single-sex education in this nation has been premised instead upon the belief that men and

137. See VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2275-76.
138. See id. at 2279.
139. See, e.g., HALL & SANDLER, supra note 13, at 7-9.
140. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Women’s Schools Together, Inc., et al. at 14-22; VMI V, 116 S. Ct.
2264 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107).
141. Justice Scalia asserted that VMI effectively eliminated private single-sex schools because many
receive indirect federal assistance in the form of student loans, tax exemptions, etc. See VMI V, 116 S. Ct.
at 2306-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 2284-85.
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women are fundamentally different, with differing educational needs. As
Justice Ginsberg explained, higher education was considered by leading experts
144
of the time to be dangerous and inappropriate for women. Experts claimed
that scientific evidence established that women were physically and tempera145
mentally not suited to the rigors of the academy. The exclusion of women from
educational opportunities was also rationalized by the different norms and ex146
pectations of men and women in society. Separate education for men and
147
women paralleled the separate spheres that each was expected to occupy.
While some claim that women occupy a different position because they
have been discriminated against, others rely on essentialist notions and difference theories to claim that women are more likely than men to have different af148
fective traits and needs. According to these theorists, women’s colleges permit
women to benefit from learning in a community of peers that is more
“relational” or non-hierarchical than coeducational or predominantly male envi149
ronments. By sponsoring sex-segregation in public schools, states may validate
and perpetuate generalizations about “the way women are” which historically
have been used to deny a host of opportunities to women. Even if a state claims
that its support for all-female schools is based on its desire to remedy the differ150
ential treatment of women in chilly coeducational classrooms rather than accommodate innate differences between men and women, the distinction is apt to
be blurred in a society in which gender inequity still exists.
Because the classification of gender does not appear to be an instrument of
power, equal protection jurisprudence erroneously assumes that gender classifications are not inherently invidious. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein disagrees. She explained that the social construction of gender represents the categories of male
and female as dichotomous, bipolar opposites which invariably foster a belief
151
that men and women are inherently different. Epstein observed that belief in
gender difference permeates society, ranging from acknowledgment of physical
differences to the assumption that men and women have different, and opposite,
152
personality traits and affective characteristics. All societies use sex to differentiate their members, dividing the public and private spheres into men’s and
153
women’s roles. Gender distinctions rationalize the exclusion of women from
power and opportunity as a natural consequence of gender difference. They also
143. See, e.g., id. at 2277, 2280-81.
144. See id. at 2277.
145. See EDWARD H. CLARKE, SEX IN EDUCATION: OR, A FAIR CHANCE FOR THE GIRLS 21-118 (1873)
(discussing why biological differences between the sexes argue against coeducation).
146. See discussion supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
147. Cf. Jane Roland Martin, Bound for the Promised Land: The Gendered Character of Higher Education, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 3, 15-21 (1997) (discussing the education-gender system).
148. See GILLIGAN, supra note 52, at 22.
149. See discussion supra note 50-74 and accompanying text.
150. See BERNICE R. SANDLER ET AL., THE CHILLY CLASSROOM CLIMATE: A GUIDE TO IMPROVE THE
EDUCATION OF WOMEN 65-91 (1996) (discussing strategies for remedying “the chilly classroom.”).
151. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Tinkerbells and Pinups: The Construction and Reconstruction of Gender
Boundaries at Work, in CULTIVATING DIFFERENCES: SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES AND THE MAKING OF INEQUALITY 232, 233-38 (Michèle Lamont & Marcel Fournier eds., 1992).
152. See id. at 232; see also Epstein, supra note 31, at 107-11.
153. See Epstein, supra note 151, at 232.
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inevitably invite comparisons: the attributes, capacities, and roles assigned to
men are more valued by society than those assigned to women.
The myth of difference has been used throughout history to segregate
154
women in the private sphere and exclude them from power. As Epstein explained, social science research that purports to find sex differences is not neu155
tral or objective but replete with bias and methodological error. It is easy to
condemn Bradwell and a host of pre-Reed decisions as resting on outmoded gender norms and beliefs. But these paternalistic notions of women permeated the
156
body of scientific literature widely accepted at the time. The use of social science as evidence to justify the segregation of women in education is particularly
dangerous. What is more subtle, however, are feminist claims of difference that
similarly treat gender as dichotomous categories, and thus reinforce the myth of
gender difference. In an effort to revalue the contributions of women, some
feminists have sought to celebrate the value of attributes historically assigned to
women by male society. Many of these theorists, however, accept as a given that
157
men and women are bipolar categories of persons. In proclaiming the desirability of traits ascribed to the female gender, these feminists reinscribe gender
as a natural category.
VMI offers an invaluable lesson about the dangers of espousing difference
as a rationale for separation. In their haste to preserve VMI’s male-only tradition, the lower courts embraced without question the most blatant of gender
stereotypes and generalizations offered by Virginia to exclude women. VMI’s
experts explained that women are “not capable of the ferocity requisite to make
158
the program [at VMI] work.” Unlike men, women “respond more naturally to
an ethic of care,” premised on the notion that “no one should be hurt,” rather
159
than on the male egalitarian “ethic of justice.” If admitted to VMI’s rigorous
Corps of Cadets system, women would “break down crying” and suffer
160
“psychological trauma.” Both trials in VMI were flashbacks in time to an era of
romantic paternalism that disguised discrimination as benevolent protection.
Claims of difference are inherently dangerous. When invoked as a justification for denying women access to VMI, Virginia’s claims of difference appeared
disingenuous, an obvious rationalization for denying qualified women who
would prefer a stressful educational experience from VMI. When invoked by
well-meaning feminists or educators to justify sex-segregated education pro154. See discussion supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
155. See Epstein, supra note 151, at 234-35.
156. See CLARKE, supra note 145, at 21-118, 127 (1873) (“Identical education of the sexes is a crime
before God and humanity that physiology protests against, and that experience weeps over.”). In
the book, which became the leading authority for the foes of coeducation, Clarke argued that colleges could not possibly afford to accommodate the biological needs of women because of the theoretical and clinical interference of menstruation on a classical education. See id.; see also PIERRE
BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE 105 (1984) (“[O]ne sees the
effect of the dispositions associated with gender,” resulting in girls choosing more literary pursuits
and boys choosing more scientific areas).
157. See, e.g., CAROL BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN’S WAYS OF KNOWING 76-99 (1986); GILLIGAN, supra
note 52.
158. Brief for the Petitioner at 38, VMI V, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 94-1941) (citations omitted).
159. Id.
160. Id.
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grams, claims that women and men have “different ways of knowing,” speak
162
in a “different voice,” or utilize different management techniques, while heard
by feminists as validation of qualities historically undervalued and attributed to
women, are heard by the rest of society as justifications for excluding women
and treating them differently.
B. The Reinforcement of Generalizations
As in other contexts, claims about so-called differences between girls and
boys in academic performance are based upon the erroneous belief that gender
is a valid predictor of individual performance or traits. The use of gender as a
category of classification appears so natural that claims of difference are accepted as objective truth. While accounts of the classroom as a chilly environment for girls and of the disproportionate lack of interest in math and science ca163
reers of girls appear well-founded, gender is not a good predictor of academic
164
performance. Focusing on “gender differences” in academic achievement and
interest in science and math is misleading at best: it obscures the significant ef165
fect of socioeconomic status in shaping students’ educational experiences.
The Educational Foundation of the American Association of University
Women (AAUW) commissioned the Wellesley College Center for Research on
166
Women to study girls and education. The AAUW issued a report in 1992 on
167
the Center’s major findings, entitled How Schools Shortchange Girls. The report
confirmed what many have observed: males receive more attention from teachers in the classroom than females: “[W]hether one looks at preschool classrooms
or university lecture halls, at female teachers or male teachers, research spanning
the past twenty years consistently reveals that males receive more teacher atten168
tion than do females.” Further, there is a tendency, beginning at the preschool
level, to select classroom activities that appeal to boys’ interests and to select
169
presentation formats “in which boys excel or are encouraged more than girls.”
Some experts, and many supporters of single-sex schools, claim that inattention
to young women in the classroom tends to negatively affect their self-esteem and
confidence, encourage silence, and discourage young women from pursuing
170
predominantly male subjects such as science and math. Two recent studies
have found that the bias in favor of boys is particularly apparent in science
171
classes.
161. See BELENKY, supra note 157.
162. See GILLIGAN, supra note 52.
163. See, e.g., SANDLER ET AL, supra note 150, at 7-17, 33-35; Mary Baldwin Brief, supra note 79, at 820.
164. See Epstein, supra note 31, at 108-11; see also infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 206-220 and accompanying text.
166. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, HOW SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS iv-v (1992) [hereinafter
AAUW REPORT].
167. See id.
168. Id. at 60.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., SANDLER ET AL., supra note 150, at 7-17, 33-35; Mary Baldwin Brief, supra note 79, at 820.
171. See AAUW REPORT, supra note 166, at 70 (citing J. Kahle, Why Girls Don’t Know, in WHAT
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While the lack of attention to girls has been well documented, the effect of
specific teacher behaviors on student performance and motivation has not. In
other words, we know that boys receive more attention than girls in the classroom, but we do not know the cause or the most effective solution. The AAUW
172
report suggested that more research in this area is needed. Moreover, focusing
on gender reveals only a part of the story. Race and socioeconomic status also
play important roles in identifying and explaining discriminatory treatment in
the classroom. The AAUW report suggested that research on student-teacher
interactions “has rarely looked at the interaction of gender with race, ethnicity,
173
and/or social class.” The limited data that exists indicates that “while males
receive more teacher attention than females, white boys receive more attention
174
than boys from various racial and ethnic minority groups.”
The evidence on the effect of low self-esteem and confidence among girls
also appears to be mixed. According to the AAUW report, even though girls report being more anxious about tests than boys, their increased anxiety does not
175
correlate with lower test performance. Regardless of the effect on performance,
the AAUW report said that a lack of confidence in math or science is “strongly
176
correlated” with continuation of study in the subjects. Overall, though, the
AAUW report indicated that gender differences in the number of math and sci177
ence courses taken were small.
Whether there is a gender difference in academic performance or
achievement in part depends on how achievement and abilities are measured.
The AAUW report concluded that “[t]here is considerable evidence that girls
178
earn higher grades than boys throughout their school careers.” But in measuring the achievement of girls and boys, studies commonly relied on standardized
179
test scores instead of grades. There is ample evidence, however, that stan180
dardized tests are biased in favor of males. As the AAUW report noted, questions of sex bias in the design and administration of tests must be considered
when evaluating claims that test scores reveal gender differences in achieve181
ment. Standardized tests which are equally valid in measuring achievement
can be developed which, depending on the test, will reveal that girls or boys
182
score higher on average. The AAUW report explained that it is possible to create or eliminate sex “differences” in test scores simply by the selection of test
RESEARCH SAYS TO THE SCIENCE TEACHER—THE PROCESS OF KNOWING (M. Rowe ed., 1990); Valerie Lee,
Sexism in Single-Sex and Coeducational Secondary School Classrooms, Presentation to the American
Sociological Association (Aug. 9, 1991) (transcript on file with author).
172. See AAUW REPORT, supra note 166, at 70.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 56.
176. See id. at 28.
177. See id. at 26-27. The pattern of science courses taken, however, is somewhat different. Girls tend
to take more advanced biology courses while boys tend to take more advanced physics and chemistry.
See id. at 27.
178. Id. at 22.
179. See id. at 52.
180. See infra notes 189-205 and accompanying text.
181. See AAUW REPORT, supra note 166, at 52.
182. See id.
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items. Test items vary according to the skill areas that are tested, the format of
the item (whether it is an essay question or multiple choice), and the item content and context (including the reference to gender and selection of test material
184
that is more familiar to boys or girls). The AAUW report concluded that “[t]he
relative emphasis placed on different skill areas within a content area deter185
mines if a test will help minimize or maximize sex differences.” For example,
girls perform better than boys on average on mathematics tests which emphasize
186
computational skills, logic, and combined arithmetic and algebra skills. On the
other hand, boys outperform girls on average on mathematics tests which em187
phasize word problems and combined arithmetic and geometry skills. Similarly, “[g]irls tend to score higher on essay or open-ended items, while boys tend
188
to score higher on multiple-choice items.”
The Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) exemplifies the potential for gender bias
in standardized tests. While SAT scores are designed to predict college perform189
ance, they in fact underpredict women’s college grades and overpredict men’s.
As the AAUW report showed, women tend to receive higher grades in college
190
than men with the same SAT scores. Reliance on SAT scores has practical consequences for women: while young women on average receive higher grades in
high school and college, young men are twice as likely to receive college scholar191
ships that are based on test scores. As the AAUW report concluded, bias in
192
testing results in “an inaccurate picture of girls’ and boys’ abilities.” The
AAUW report recommended against relying exclusively on standardized test
193
scores when evaluating the relative skills and abilities of girls and boys. With
that cautionary note, the AAUW report noted that gender differences which do
194
exist in math performance are small and declining. A recent study of twelfthgrade students’ scores on math and verbal achievement tests revealed that gender accounts for less than two percent of the difference in math scores between
195
girls and boys. Moreover, the differences occurred largely in the top end of
183. See id. at 55.
184. See id. at 54.
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. Id. at 55.
189. See id. at 56.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 52.
192. Id. at 57.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 24.
195. Patricia Campbell, an educational consultant who specializes in the area of gender equity testified as an expert witness on behalf of Shannon Faulkner in The Citadel litigation. See Deposition of
Patricia Campbell, Ph.D. at 2-3, Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993) (No. 2:92-1674-2). We
asked her to examine the extent to which a variety of factors, including gender, accounted for variation
in national test scores of twelfth grade students in math. See id. at 168. The purpose of the evaluation
was to use recent data to test the common perception that there is a significant gender gap in math. See
id. Dr. Campbell used the underlying data from a 1993 study of high school achievement of twelfth
grade students conducted by the National Assessment of Educational Progress in 1992. See id. at 171.
The data consists of a representative sample of tens of thousands of students. See id. To test the relative
importance of gender, Dr. Campbell evaluated the test scores to determine the amount of variation in
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196

scores.
The AAUW report further observed that the vast majority of observable
differences were attributable to factors that were not indicative of true difference: the age of the sample, how academically selective the test was, and which
197
cognitive level was tested. One meta-analysis test showed that eighty-seven
percent of the already insignificant variance in scores was attributable to these
198
three factors. When scores were considered by age of the student, differences
199
in variation also appeared.
Many studies have concluded that differences in group performance of
boys and girls are minimal or non-existent at the elementary and middle school
200
level. While differences are larger at high levels of achievement, the overall
201
variation due to gender is still statistically insignificant and declining. While
SAT test scores continue to reflect average differences in performance of young
202
women and men in mathematics, the gap has been steadily declining. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the SAT as a standardized test “finds
203
larger differences than other standardized tests.” As discussed above, the SAT
204
is not a reliable measure of academic achievement or potential. Moreover, the
differences in SAT performance may be a result of materials provided to students prior to the test which advise students that girls do not perform as well as
205
boys on the test.
While much of the focus among feminists and many educators has been on
the effect of gender, many other categories account for substantially greater
206
variation in test scores, including socioeconomic status (SES) and race. The
test scores that occurred when the students’ scores were considered according to: (a) the gender of the
students; (b) the race of the student; (c) whether the school that the student attended was public or private; and (d) whether the student was from the northeast or southeast area of the nation. See id. at Exh.
2. In measuring the amount of variation, Dr. Campbell used the categories of scores developed by the
National Educational Longitudinal Survey, which reports students’ scores as advanced, proficient, basic, and below basic. See id. at 163-77. For each variable, she evaluated the percentage of variation in the
math scores that occurred when each of the four variables was considered. See id. at Exh. 2. Significantly, the data did not permit evaluation of the effect of socioeconomic status on math performance.
See id. The purpose of the analysis was not to identify the factors which causally effect performance, but
merely to evaluate common beliefs about the role of gender in math scores. See id. at 163-77. Contrary to
popular belief, this data did not reveal a “gender gap” in math scores. See id. at Exh. 2. In terms of prediction, race accounted for the greatest amount of variation at the proficient, basic, and below basic levels. See id. Whether the school was public or private was the next best predictor, with the regional location of the school next. See id. Unlike the other three variables, gender resulted in very little variation in
the math scores of these twelfth grade students. See id.
196. See AAUW REPORT, supra note 166, at 25.
197. See id. at 24.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 25, 30-31.
203. Id. at 31 (citations omitted).
204. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
205. See AAUW REPORT, supra note 166, at 131.
206. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Minorities Falling Behind in Student Achievement: Gap in Scores
Grows After Years of Progress, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1996, at 9 (reporting that minority students are
falling behind white students in standardized test results).
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AAUW concluded that SES was the best predictor of both grades and test
207
scores. Gender may favor either boys or girls, depending on the race and SES
208
of the sample tested. The combined effect of SES, race, and gender has not re209
ceived much scholarly or public attention. However, the AAUW study reported that among high SES eighth-grade students, girls were less likely to be in
advanced math than boys, and no more likely than boys to be in advanced
210
reading. Among low SES students, girls outperformed boys. Low SES eighthgrade girls, for example, were “less likely than boys to test below basic levels in
211
reading and math.” Low SES boys are more likely to have repeated a grade
212
than low SES girls. Indeed, fully “one-third of all low-SES boys are held back
213
at least one grade.” The AAUW report concluded that there is a “marked bi214
polarity” in the relative achievement of low SES girls versus high SES girls.
“[T]hose of low socioeconomic status are more likely to do better than similar
boys, while those at high socioeconomic status are only as likely and often less
215
likely to do as well as boys.”
Some studies have reported fewer gender differences in mathematics for
216
minority students than for white students. Again, SES made a difference.
While high SES boys regardless of race “clearly do better than girls . . . [t]he dif217
ferences are most striking among black students.” This does not mean, of
course, that low income girls or children of color are doing well. Nearly twenty218
nine percent of “low-SES black girls also were held back at least one grade.”
The AAUW report stated that even after SES was taken into account, “racial and
219
ethnic differences persist in both data sets.”
Claims about gender difference are based upon the popular misconception
that gender is a valid predictor of academic achievement, rather than a product
of gender stereotypes. The empirical data do not support the claim that gender
or race is most correlated with student performance: it is their socioeconomic
220
status. Knowing these facts, it is clear that while the Young Women’s Leadership School will undoubtedly provide its students access to valuable educational
resources, it would likely benefit any student, regardless of gender or race.
If a state sees its students in terms of their gender or race, rather than their
socioeconomic status, it will fail to address the very real need for more resources

207. See AAUW REPORT, supra note 166, at 33.
208. See id. at 33-36.
209. See id. at 33.
210. See id. at 34.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 35.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 34.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 25.
217. Id. at 35. The AAUW suggested that the difference among high SES black students may be due
to the fact that these students were more likely to be in desegregated schools. See id. There is evidence
that black girls do not do as well as black boys in desegregated schools. See id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 33.
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and financial support for education. Separating children on the basis of gender
or race may help some, but it will divert limited resources from more costeffective solutions that have the potential to reach a greater number of people.
221
In Garrett v. Board of Education, the Eastern District of Michigan preliminarily enjoined the Detroit Board of Education from excluding females from
three public academies which were formed to address high unemployment
rates, school dropout levels, and homicide among urban African American
222
males. The academies were prepared to teach 250 boys from preschool through
223
fifth grade, and then phase in programs for sixth through eighth grades. The
academies, developed by a private organization, planned to offer special programs including an afrocentric curriculum, a “Rites of Passage” class designed
for adolescent males, career preparation, an emphasis on male responsibility,
224
mentors, individualized counseling, and student uniforms.
The American Civil Liberties Union and National Organization of Women
(NOW) challenged the schools’ admission policies, arguing that the Board of
Education deliberately chose to ignore the rights of girls in the public school
system, contrary to the advice of state governmental authorities and in violation
225
of federal law. The Board argued that the academies served a valid purpose
because coeducation had resulted in lower achievement levels for boys than for
226
girls. The male academies, the Board argued, would improve boys’ perform227
ance. Defendants further argued that the Board had developed alternative
programs housed in single-sex schools that addressed the specific needs of fe228
males, such as teen pregnancy.
In granting preliminary relief, the district court found that the all-male
229
academies likely violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court agreed that
the state’s objective was important, but that the Board of Education had failed to
prove that the exclusion of girls was necessary to combat unemployment, drop230
out, and homicide rates among urban males. The court found that there was no
evidence that the school system failed boys because girls were in the classroom;
231
the system failed girls as well. While meeting the needs of inner-city males was
an important objective, the court held that it was “insufficient to override the
232
rights of females to equal opportunities.”
The analysis of the district judge in Garrett applies equally in the case of
single-sex schools for girls: given that the schools have failed all students, does
excluding boys from a valuable educational experience substantially advance
the state’s interest in educating its citizenry? Focusing remedial attention on the
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
See id. at 1006, 1007.
See id. at 1006.
See id.
See id. at 1005.
See id.. at 1007.
See id.
See id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1007-08 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
See id. at 1008.
See id. at 1014.

PPVOJDIK

92 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

12/05/97 3:38 PM

Volume 4:69

1997

“wrong” category not only misunderstands the problem, it diverts attention
from more effective solutions that are more likely to improve academic
achievement.
C. The Alleged Superiority of Single-Sex Educational Environments
Even assuming that there is a legitimate need to remedy past discrimination against girls in public education, single-sex education for girls will not substantially advance that objective. Supporters of single-sex schools for girls claim
that an environment that focuses solely on girls is a more conducive environment for learning. All-female classes allegedly remove the pressure to conform
to societal expectations that do not reinforce high academic achievement. With
boys absent, teachers may be free to focus all of their attention on girls. Moreover, female students have greater opportunities for leadership roles. Supporters
of single-sex schools claim that sex-segregated education contributes to higher
233
academic achievement, self-esteem, and confidence in young women.
As in Garrett, the relevant question here is whether the absence of male students will substantially improve girls’ educational performance and experience.
The empirical evidence as to the relative effectiveness of single-sex secondary
234
education is ambiguous. Proponents of single-sex education rely on a number
of studies of single-sex Catholic primary and secondary schools and private independent schools which indicate that single-sex education is beneficial for girls
235
but provides little or no benefits for boys (and possibly has negative effects).
While one might disagree with the methodology or results of these studies, the
crucial question is whether these studies can be extrapolated to public schools.
Valerie Lee, a professor of education at the University of Michigan, has re236
searched single-sex secondary education for several years. She has conducted
two longitudinal studies, using data from the United States Department of
Education’s High School and Beyond, comparing Catholic students in single-sex
237
and coeducational high schools. The first study, published in 1986, found that
girls attending girls’ schools “were favored by that experience in a number of
238
academic and affective domains.” A second study published in 1990 followed
the performance of a group of students and found that many favorable effects of
attending Catholic girls’ secondary schools were sustained for the students in
college, even though very few of the students attended either single-sex or
239
Catholic colleges. Thus it was difficult to determine whether the positive effects resulted from the students’ secondary school experience, or from their college experience.

See VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1435.
See discussion supra notes 163-220 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Valerie Lee, Single-Sex Schooling: What is the Issue?, in SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING:
PERSPECTIVES FROM PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 39 (Dec. 22 Draft Report) (Office of Educ. Res. & Improvement, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 1992).
236. See id. at 39.
237. See id. at 40.
238. Id. at 40.
239. See id.
233.
234.
235.

PPVOJDIK

12/05/97 3:38 PM

GIRLS’ SCHOOLS AFTER VMI: DO THEY MAKE THE GRADE?

93

Having studied only Catholic schools, Lee decided to compare private, independent single-sex schools to determine whether the findings for Catholic
240
schools were similar to those in the independent schools. She collected and
analyzed extensive data on students, teachers, classrooms, and schools in a
stratified, nationally representative random sample of sixty schools that belonged to the National Association of Independent Schools (NAIS) for the 198889 school year (twenty girls’ schools, twenty boys’ schools, and twenty coeduca241
tional schools). She employed a similar set of statistical controls for student
background and school contexts, including adjustments for school selectivity, an
242
important characteristic of NAIS schools. As with the Catholic schools, Lee
analyzed an array of variables, including students’ course work, achievement,
perceptions of school climate, school-related values and experiences, and per243
sonal and social values.
Lee reported that “analysis of the relative effectiveness of single-sex and
244
coeducation in NAIS schools has produced equivocal results.” The results for
NAIS schools suggested that there were few positive effects from single-sex
245
schools, and some negative effects. Moreover, “there is no consistent pattern of
results favoring either single-sex or coeducational schools, either for girls or
246
boys.” Based on the differences in results between Catholic and private
schools, Lee suspected that the effects of certain types of single-sex schools are
247
not generalizable across sectors. She raised the crucial question posed by
YWLS: is the existing research on single-sex schools, almost all of which is based
on private schools, applicable to inner-city youth? Given the apparent lack of
generalizability of the data, the answer might well be no.
Lee’s research raised another troubling issue. In her NAIS study, she and
her team paid two to three day visits to a sample of twenty-one of the sixty
248
schools, most of which was spent observing classes. To her surprise, Lee observed incidents of sexism in close to half the classes observed, noting as well
249
that none of the schools was free of sexism. Lee concluded that “[t]he absence
of one sex in single-sex classrooms does not ensure that sexism will not occur—
in fact, the most serious incidents we observed were in all boys’ classes with
250
male teachers.” Lee observed teachers in girls’ schools attempting to accommodate girls’ purported “relational” style by stereotyping girls, avoiding putting
demands on girls, avoiding aggressive teaching, “over-anticipating academic
problems and offering help before it was requested,” and treating them “in a
251
somewhat infantile and overly ‘lady-like’ manner.” While most of the sexist
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See id. at 41.
See id.
See id. at 42.
See id.
See id. at 41.
See id. at 42.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 43.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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behavior observed in girls’ schools occurred in only two of seven schools, which
were not very demanding academically, the assumption that girls’ schools are
252
free of sexism is unwarranted.
Whether YWLS, or any single-sex school for girls, can demonstrate that it is
likely to enhance girls’ performance as compared to coeducational schools remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that it is not the only method of improving gender equity and performance in schools. There is evidence that girls’
interest in math and science can be improved by a variety of interventions, including career conferences focusing on math and science, summer math and sci253
ence programs, and residential science institutes for girls. For example, the
AAUW report says that a group of “average” minority junior high school girls
who attended a four-week summer program on math and science “increased
254
their math and science course-taking plans an average of forty percent.” Another study evaluated the effect of a one-day career conference and found that
“six months after attending the conference, girls’ math and science career interests and course-taking plans were higher than they were prior to the confer255
ence.”
In addition to special interventions, simple teaching techniques can dramatically improve gender equity in the classroom. Education experts have developed a range of recommendations and techniques that teachers can employ to
treat boys and girls more equally in the classroom: for example, pausing before
calling on students, which encourages girls to volunteer, or advising students to
take a minute to consider a question before responding, which similarly in256
creases girls’ participation.
Given the availability of successful alternatives to single-sex schools, it is
difficult to argue persuasively that the state must resort to segregating girls in
order to offer them an education free of discrimination. The problem is not with
the girls; the problem is with the classroom and the school system. As argued
below, to segregate girls is to give up on them and to send the message that the
responsible adults in society are unable (or unwilling) to prevent discrimination
in our public schools. That is very disempowering indeed.
D. Compensatory Measures or Reversion to Traditional Gender Norms?
While many question the effectiveness of assimilation as a tactic for equality, the decisions to fund single-sex programs for women at Mary Baldwin and
Converse Colleges, and to create a new girls’ school in Harlem, did not result
from informed debate or a genuine concern about achieving gender equity, but
from private organizations and individuals with conservative social agendas.
While Virginia and South Carolina claimed that their leadership programs were
257
designed to provide women with a superior education, the programs were
252. See id. at 44.
253. See AAUW REPORT, supra note 166, at 29.
254. See id.
255. Id.
256. See SANDLER ET AL., supra note 150, at 75-86.
257. Brief Amici Curiae for the State of South Carolina et al. at 19-20, VMI V, 116 S Ct. 2264
(1996) (Nos. 94-1941) [hereinafter The Citadel Brief].
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actually designed to rescue VMI and The Citadel from court decisions finding an
equal protection violation. Both programs were based upon, and reinforced, traditional gender norms. Like the leadership programs at Mary Baldwin and
Converse College, supporters of YWLS likewise assume that women have different educational needs that are better served in a supportive and nurturing
258
educational environment. While public officials now defend the school under a
259
compensatory rationale, there is little evidence that this is the true purpose of
the school.
The move to reinstitute single-sex education in New York City did not
originate with elected officials, but with a well funded, conservative thinktank
260
with a political agenda of privatizing schools. Consideration of the complicated issues raised by single-sex education for women should include the convergence of interests that these gender classifications serve. The role of the
Manhattan Institute in formulating and advocating YWLS likewise raises substantial questions about the propriety of state officials using private funds and
resources donated by private interests who seek to resurrect single-sex education to further traditional gender norms. Education falls within the province of
state and local authorities, who are supposedly able to represent the interests
and needs of their constituents. Virginia and South Carolina argued that states
should be free to determine how best to meet the education needs of their citizens, and to exercise their discretion in how to use limited funds to offer a range
261
of education programs that best meets the needs of most students. In this
world of states’ rights, education systems are described as smorgasbords of
choice and diversity. When a private donor earmarks certain funds or resources
for a particular education program, however, there is danger that the state may
make education policy decisions that are not based on the best interests of the
community, but on the agenda of private interests. In reality, the power of influential and wealthy private interests to advance their political agenda at the expense of the education interests of minority groups can be substantial.
Private funding of programs that improve access of all students to a high
quality education may be relatively benign. However, private funding of programs that are targeted to benefit certain groups of students should be scrutinized to insure that the program does not reinforce existing inequalities. The
VMI and Citadel cases illustrate the danger of permitting states to use private
funds to preserve single-sex education for men only. The defense of these allmale institutions was subsidized by their alumni, who contributed millions of
262
dollars to preserve their all-male status. After the Fourth Circuit held that VMI
263
and The Citadel must remedy their unlawful exclusion of women, alumni

258. Julia Cohen, Esq., Remarks at the Cardozo Law School (Oct. 31, 1996) (transcript on file
with author).
259. See Steinberg, supra note 8, at B3.
260. See id.
261. Faulkner v. Jones, 855 F. Supp. 552, 560 (D.S.C. 1994), aff’d in part modified in part, 51 F.3d
440 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1996); VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1409; Brief for CrossPetitioners, VMI V, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107).
262. See Vojdik, supra note 48, at 1-2.
263. See VMI II, 976 F.2d at 892; Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440, 450 (4th Cir. 1995).
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reached deep into their pockets and committed millions more to create the
264
“leadership” programs for women at Mary Baldwin and Converse Colleges.
Following the announcement of the creation of YWLS, a wake of public
controversy ensued, prompting the New York City Board of Education to
265
schedule a public hearing to discuss the proposal. The hearing was held just
days after the plans became public, with scant time to meaningfully assess the
need or desirability for a public girls’ program. In response to complaints by
civil rights organizations that VMI prohibits public single-sex schools, school officials defended the school’s exclusionary policy by asserting that girls in singlesex schools perform better in math and science than girls in coeducational
266
schools. The Board of Education, under the leadership of a Republican mayor
who proposed three weeks later to send public schoolchildren to Catholic
schools, endorsed the plan and voted to expand it into an all-girls’ high school
267
over the next few years.
The New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU), NOW, and the Coalition for
Civil Rights, responded by filing an administrative complaint with the federal
268
Department of Education in September challenging the all-female school.
Echoing Justice Scalia’s dissent in VMI, these civil rights organizations claim that
269
VMI prohibits single-sex education. Their administrative complaint alleged
270
that the school violated Title IX’s prohibition against the creation of new sin271
gle-sex schools or programs. It further alleged that the Board of Education did
not create the girls-only school to serve a compensatory purpose and that the
272
Board was seeking to exclude boys solely on the basis of gender.
The announcement of the establishment of YWLS has sparked a heated
controversy over whether, under VMI, states may or should offer single-sex
primary or secondary schools for girls for the ostensible purpose of improving
their educational experience. Contrary to the dire predictions of the defendants,
the Court did not hold in VMI that single-sex education is per se unconstitu273
tional, nor ensure that it is “functionally dead.”
While VMI does not per se prohibit public girls’ schools, it is nevertheless
doubtful that New York school officials will be able to demonstrate that public
274
schools for girls serve an “exceedingly persuasive justification.” Under VMI
and Hogan, the “mere recitation of a benign [or] compensatory purpose” or other

264. See The Citadel Brief, supra note 257, at 5-6; Vojdik, supra note 48, at 2 n.7.
265. See Steinberg, supra note 8, at B3.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See Administrative Complaint at Exh. B, National Org. for Women v. New York City Bd. of
Educ. (Dep’t of Educ. Aug. 22, 1996) [hereinafter Complaint].
269. See id. at 1 & Exh. B.
270. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994).
271. See Complaint, supra note 268, at 1.
272. See id. at 1.
273. See VMI V, 116 S. Ct. at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the risks and costs associated
with litigating the constitutionality of single-sex education programs are too high for states to continue
operating or implementing such programs).
274. Id. at 2267.
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275

governmental objective will not be accepted at face value. Courts must examine the facts to determine whether the proffered justification is the actual pur276
pose of the single-sex program. In this case, it is not clear that New York City
school officials agreed to create YWLS to redress past discrimination in public
education. From the beginning, the proposal and plans for the girls’ school were
withheld from the public, making it difficult to determine the actual purpose of
the school. While school officials now claim that the school seeks to improve
277
girls’ performance in math and science, there is no evidence that this was the
actual purpose of the school rather than a post hoc rationalization in the face of
threatened litigation by the NYCLU and NOW.
Before filing the complaint with the Department of Education, the NYCLU
and NOW wrote to the Board of Education to advise it that they considered the
278
school in violation of Title IX as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in VMI,
which the NYCLU and NOW construed to prohibit public single-sex schools for
279
women as well as for men. In response to the NYCLU and NOW letter, counsel
for the Board of Education stated that neither the Chancellor nor the Board had
280
made a final determination regarding the creation of the girls’ school. The
Board’s counsel disagreed, however, that VMI or Hogan would prohibit the
281
creation of the school. The letter does not assert that the school is intended to
282
serve a remedial or compensatory objective.
After the NYCLU and NOW filed their administrative complaint, the Board
of Education for the first time advised the press that the girls’ school was intended to benefit girls, whom it claimed perform better in math and science if
boys are not in the same classroom. The Board cited general research (which it
did not identify) which purportedly shows that some girls do not perform as
283
well, or participate as much, in coeducational classrooms. The Board also
claimed that the fifty-student class for YWLS had already been filled for Fall
284
1996. While the school stated that it would accept applications from boys, the
285
Board “reserved” a decision on whether to admit boys in the future.
The Board of Education never sought the advice or counsel of the Chancellor of Education’s Task Force on Sex Equity in New York Schools, which has
286
been monitoring gender equity in the public schools since 1983. The Task Force
275. See id. at 2277 (citations omitted).
276. See id.
277. See Jacques Steinberg, Rights Groups Seek to Bar Girls-Only School, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at
B2.
278. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88.
279. See Letter from Norman Siegal, Executive Director of the NYCLU, and Christopher Dunn,
Acting Legal Director of the NYCLU, to Rudolph F. Crew, Chancellor, New York City Board of Education (July 15, 1996) (on file with the Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy ).
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Education, to Norman Siegal, Executive Director of the NYCLU (July 23, 1996) (on file with the Duke
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issued a report on the status of girls’ achievement in 1994 which included a
number of recommendations to the Board of Education for improving gender
287
equity. None of the recommendations included offering girls single-sex educa288
tion. The Task Force proposed, for example, that teachers receive training in
pedagogical methods to use in the classroom to promote girls’ participation and
289
achievement. Moreover, in 1995, the Board refused to approve $500,000 to
fund junior varsity athletics for girls in New York City schools, despite the consensus among experts that participation in athletics has a positive effect on girls’
290
self-esteem and confidence. The Board also refused to require its teachers and
administrators to receive training in nondiscrimination and equal opportunity
291
regulations, training which federal regulations specify as mandatory. The
Board’s previous lack of commitment to issues of gender equity and improving
the quality of girls’ education undercuts its recent attempt to justify the girlsonly school as compensatory.
The mission and curriculum of the school is also not consistent with an attempt to provide disadvantaged girls remedial education in math or science. A
document entitled The Young Women’s Leadership School in Community District 4,
prepared prior to July 16, 1996, describes the goals and methodology of the girls’
292
school. As described in the document, the school does not reflect any compensatory purpose or plan for improving girls’ underperformance in science and
293
math. Rather, the school purports to address the “complexities” of modern life
294
through a demanding and rigorous curriculum. The document claims that
“[o]ur society is changing in ways that are unprecedented; children are subject to
influences that did not even exist in previous generations. It is clearly a time
when schools need to redefine the ways in which they prepare our young
295
women to thrive amid the complexities of modern life.” The document does
not identify these “influences” or “complexities” of modern life. The description
of the school also does not suggest that its mission is to improve the girls’ academic performance or to rectify past discrimination against young women in coeducational schools. The document instead repeatedly refers to the need for
challenging and demanding curricula to prepare students for college and to
“instill in the students the characteristics of intellect and spirit that will make
296
them leaders of their generations.” The document claims that the girls’ school
will offer a “demanding course of study in the middle school (grades seven and
eight) which will expose students to a broad knowledge base and prepare them
YORK CITY PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS: SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES ON THE BASIS OF SEX IN ENROLLMENTS,
MATH AND SCIENCE ACHIEVEMENT, AND STAFFING 1 (1994).
287. See id. at 23-26.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See Interview with Rose Korten, Deputy Director for High School Sports, Board of Education
of the City of New York, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 18, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
291. See Comments by Tanya Lewis, Director of the Office of Equal Educational Opportunity for the
New York City School Board, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 18, 1996).
292. See Complaint, supra note 268, at 4 & Exh. D.
293. See id. at Exh. D.
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for the scholastic commitments expected in our college preparatory upper school
297
(grades nine through twelve).” The document states that the school will offer
“advanced study,” including advanced placement courses, in its high school
298
program, “a time when academic expectations are at their most unyielding.”
Admission to the high school is not automatic; a student must “fulfill stringent
299
requirements” before being admitted.
As described in the document, the school does not purport to address any
special or unique needs of young women. Instead, it will “attend to the developmental needs specific to pre and early adolescents” and seek to “capitalize on
the intellectual curiosity and the creative spirit which are inherent in every300
one.” The curriculum appears no different than one would expect at an independent private school.
While the city now asserts that the school will focus on math and science,
the document does not emphasize either subject or describe any plans for how to
improve girls’ interest in these subjects. Instead, the curriculum appears oriented
to the liberal arts and fine arts. For example, the middle school will offer studies
in “the liberal arts, literature, social sciences, mathematics, science, library sci301
ence, computer, health, visual arts, music, drama, and physical education.”
The document does not offer any details about the math or science offerings; instead, it describes the role of culture and art. It explains that the school “will
make frequent use of New York City’s cultural resources,” offer advanced study
in “all academic, artistic, and physical disciplines,” and offer high school students “the opportunity to perform and assist in two major theater productions
302
each year.”
While the school will offer and encourage students to participate in extracurricular activities, there are no stated plans to offer any math or science clubs
303
or interest groups except a computer club for middle school students. Instead,
its offerings include such activities as a literary magazine, social action commit304
tee, and drama club. High school students are required to perform sixty hours
of community service and will be placed in settings such as health care facilities,
hospitals, “medicine scientific research institutions,” parks departments, and
305
universities and colleges.
In addition to emphasizing academics, the school for girls will offer its students access to unique and valuable resources. The faculty will for the most part
have advanced degrees, in both the field of education and in their own disci306
plines. The school will offer “a project-oriented curriculum which enables
[students] to apply facts and concepts so that knowledge is lively and has pur-
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pose,” classes that are “discussion based rather than teacher dominated,”
309
and individual weekly conferences with a faculty advisor. Quite obviously,
these features are beneficial for all students, rather than just girls. Based on this
description, the girls’ school seems more like a highly selective private school on
the Upper East Side of Manhattan rather than a public school for minority females in Harlem which is committed to a math and science centered curriculum.
IV. CONCLUSION

The battle for gender equity in our public schools is essential to assure
women access to social and economic power. Public education not only teaches
skills that are essential for later success, but shapes our daughters’ sense of
identity and self-agency while transmitting cultural norms and values. Historically, states have excluded women from public and higher education, enforcing
310
traditional gender norms that barred women from the public sphere. That discrimination against women still exists in coeducational schools is not surprising,
especially in light of the power of education to awaken the minds and aspirations of students.
In our haste to remedy the chilly classroom environment that faces many of
311
our daughters, however, we should be wary of reinvoking essentialist notions
of men and women that historically have been used to justify state enforced
separation of women in education. Rather than seek to create a truly inclusive
educational system, proponents of single-sex schools seek to resurrect a classifi312
catory scheme that mirrors the benevolent paternalism of the last century. Segregation of students based on their sex is not a new idea, but is a return to the
past when the state used its coercive power to enforce traditional gender roles
and norms.
Every female student has the right to be free from discriminatory treatment
and the right to expect that society will insist that those in charge of the classroom—teachers and administrators alike—will enforce that right. There is no
conclusive evidence that segregating women in separate schools will improve
their educational achievement. Segregated schools are not culturally neutral;
separate but equal historically has been a code for inferiority. Single-sex schools
for girls will not eliminate discriminatory treatment in coeducational schools nor
help male students overcome harmful stereotypes about the roles and abilities of
women. In contrast, there are a host of educational reforms which advance gender equity by fostering true inclusion, while simultaneously reinforcing the
value of diversity in our culture. Rather than embrace an exclusionary practice
from the past in the name of reform, we should demand that our tax dollars be
spent to remedy gender inequity and teach our students that we will not tolerate
discrimination.
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